Home / MCP registry index / dev.workers.johnaio281.farsi-tools/farsi-tools
FarsiTools (paid)
dev.workers.johnaio281.farsi-tools/farsi-tools in the official MCP registry.
Endpoint https://farsi-tools.johnaio281.workers.dev/mcp. Source: github.com/johnaio281/farsi-tools.
The registry describes it as: Persian and Iranian utilities for agents: Jalali dates, national ID, IBAN, holidays. Paid via x402.
We read its 27 tools on 2026-10-22. Nothing in them matched our tool-poisoning rules. It also sets server instructions, text a client puts in front of the model on connect; those were read too.
A clean read means these rules found nothing, not that the server is harmless. A server can change its tools at any time, which is why the index reads it again every week.
Tools it advertises
fa_normalize fa_transliterate fa_stats fa_digits fa_numberToWords fa_gregorianToJalali fa_jalaliToGregorian fa_validateNationalId fa_validateSheba fa_validateMobile fa_keywords fa_sentences fa_similarity fa_stripHtml fa_fixRtl fa_validateBankCard fa_validateCompanyId fa_validateEconomicCode fa_validatePostalCode fa_validateLandline fa_iranProvince fa_iranCity fa_iranProvinces fa_iranHolidays fa_iranHolidayCheck fa_amountToWords fa_rialToman
Run this server? Show the check in your README
The badge reflects the latest weekly read: 
[](https://lazaretto.dev/mcp-registry/dev-workers-johnaio281-farsi-tools-farsi-tools)How this was checked
Lazaretto connects to the endpoint the way any MCP client does, asks the server to introduce itself and list its tools, and reads every name, description, parameter schema and server instruction for tool poisoning: hidden directive blocks, orders to read local secrets, parameters built to carry secrets or the conversation out, orders that redirect another server's tools, and invisible characters. It never calls a tool. What we found across the registry.
To run the same check every time Claude Code adds a server, install the free lazaretto-guard plugin. Browse every server in the index.