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Curie Commerce
co.curie/commerce in the official MCP registry.
Endpoint https://chat.curie.app/api/mcp/global. Source: github.com/curievision/curie-shopify-app.
The registry describes it as: Search, compare in 3D, and buy products from 5.6M+ Shopify stores. Free tier; Pro adds checkout.
We read its 30 tools on 2026-10-22. Nothing in them matched our tool-poisoning rules. It also sets server instructions, text a client puts in front of the model on connect; those were read too.
A clean read means these rules found nothing, not that the server is harmless. A server can change its tools at any time, which is why the index reads it again every week.
Tools it advertises
get_recommendations add_product_from_photo get_availability compare_products get_brand_context get_suggested_prompts initiate_checkout search_catalog lookup_catalog get_product_details get_cart update_cart create_cart cancel_cart get_checkout update_checkout complete_checkout cancel_checkout get_order search_shop_policies_and_faqs curie_try_on_3d solve_job curie_wishlist_add curie_wishlist_get curie_wishlist_remove curie_wishlist_move_to_cart curie_cart_aggregate_add curie_cart_aggregate_get curie_cart_aggregate_remove curie_cart_aggregate_update_quantity
Run this server? Show the check in your README
The badge reflects the latest weekly read: 
[](https://lazaretto.dev/mcp-registry/co-curie-commerce)How this was checked
Lazaretto connects to the endpoint the way any MCP client does, asks the server to introduce itself and list its tools, and reads every name, description, parameter schema and server instruction for tool poisoning: hidden directive blocks, orders to read local secrets, parameters built to carry secrets or the conversation out, orders that redirect another server's tools, and invisible characters. It never calls a tool. What we found across the registry.
To run the same check every time Claude Code adds a server, install the free lazaretto-guard plugin. Browse every server in the index.