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ai.upgradeagent/upgrade-agent
ai.upgradeagent/upgrade-agent in the official MCP registry.
Endpoint https://www.upgradeagent.ai/api/mcp. Source: github.com/mikeslone-plusgrade/upgradeagent.
The registry describes it as: Quote, bid and confirm travel upgrades: eligibility, bid range, place/modify/cancel, instant buy.
We read its 21 tools on 2026-10-22. Nothing in them matched our tool-poisoning rules. It also sets server instructions, text a client puts in front of the model on connect; those were read too.
A clean read means these rules found nothing, not that the server is harmless. A server can change its tools at any time, which is why the index reads it again every week.
Tools it advertises
check_upgrade_eligibility start_eligibility_check mint_eligibility_session get_eligibility_result place_bid modify_bid get_bid_status get_offer_events get_price_breakdown cancel_bid predict_bid_success start_watch get_watch_status ask_upgrade_agent partner_question_insights partner_visibility_report usage_totals get_partner_info get_upgrade_pricing list_partners search_upgrade_options
Run this server? Show the check in your README
The badge reflects the latest weekly read: 
[](https://lazaretto.dev/mcp-registry/ai-upgradeagent-upgrade-agent)How this was checked
Lazaretto connects to the endpoint the way any MCP client does, asks the server to introduce itself and list its tools, and reads every name, description, parameter schema and server instruction for tool poisoning: hidden directive blocks, orders to read local secrets, parameters built to carry secrets or the conversation out, orders that redirect another server's tools, and invisible characters. It never calls a tool. What we found across the registry.
To run the same check every time Claude Code adds a server, install the free lazaretto-guard plugin. Browse every server in the index.